Abstract. Quantum coherence is recently formalized as a physical resource to measure the strength of superposition. Based on the resource theory, we present a systematic framework that connects a coherence measure to the security of quantum key distribution. By considering a generic entanglement-based key distribution protocol, we show that the key rate can be quantified by the coherence of the shared bipartite states. This framework allows us to derive the key rate of the BB84 and six-state protocols. Our result offers a refined key rate analysis comparing to the existing ones, with which we obtain improved results of both protocols. Furthermore, we apply it to a practical issue, detection efficiency mismatch, and obtain an improved key rate. In conclusion, this framework demonstrates the interplay among coherence, entanglement, and quantum key distribution at a fundamental level.
Introduction
As the notion that captures the quantum superposition between differentiable physical states, quantum coherence represents one of the fundamental features that distinguish quantum mechanics from its classical counterpart [1, 2] . Despite of the early recognition of its importance, quantum coherence was only recently formalized under a rigourous framework of resource theory [3] , which stimulated a rapidly growing research field on quantum coherence, ranging from its mathematical characterizations to its operational interpretations [4] .
The motivation on studying the operational interpretation of quantum coherence is two-folded. First, by linking coherence to the operational advantage of quantum information processing protocols, one can improve existing protocols and derive new ones by exploiting similar mechanisms. Second, the observable phenomenon bestowed by quantum coherence allows one to better understand the boundary between quantum and classical realms, one of the fundamental problems in theoretical physics.
The operational significance of quantum coherence has been recognized in many areas, including quantum metrology [5] , quantum computing [6] , quantum thermodynamics [7, 8] and quantum biology [9] . With the newly developed resource theory of coherence, more operational significance of coherence was discovered and quantified [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15] . Recently, it is shown that coherence quantifies the amount of unpredictable intrinsic randomness from measuring quantum states [16, 17] . Such a relation has been applied to develop source-independent quantum random number generators [18] . Take a qubit as an example, the state |ψ A = (|0 + |1 )/ √ 2 can yield intrinsic randomness when measured in the Z basis, which is unpredictable to an adversary, Eve. In comparison, the measurement result of ρ A = (|0 0| + |1 1|)/2 with zero coherence can be fully determined by Eve if she holds the purification of ρ A , that is, |ψ AE = (|00 + |11 )/ √ 2. In this paper, we investigate the significant role of coherence played in QKD, via considering the relation between coherence and intrinsic randomness. In the scenario of QKD, two legitimated users, Alice and Bob, intend to share a sequence of private and identical bits, called secret key. In a QKD security analysis, one always needs to consider two steps in postprocessing. One is error correction that ensures the keys shared by Alice and Bob to be identical. The other is privacy amplification that extracts secure key from the raw key. In general, error correction is a standard classical process; while privacy amplification is determined by the quantum procedures of the protocol. Privacy amplification plays a central role in all security proofs. For example, in the Shor-Preskill security proof [19] , privacy amplification is linked to the phase error correction in an equivalent entanglement protocol [20] . In this paper, we examine the postprocessing in an alternative way. After error correction, the amount of secret key that can be extracted from privacy amplification is essentially determined by the intrinsic randomness that is unknown to Eve. This intrinsic randomness can be quantified by the coherence of the joint system of Alice and Bob. For example, in the entanglement version of the BB84 protocol [21, 22] , suppose there are only phase errors left, the final state shared by Alice and Bob is a mixture of (|00 + |11 )/ √ 2 and (|00 − |11 )/ √ 2. If the phase error rate takes the worst case of 50%, the state becomes (|00 00| + |11 11|)/2, which has no coherence in the Z basis, and hence no secret key can be generated.
Following this spirit, we propose a generic security analysis framework for QKD, under which, we show that the key generation rate is closely related to the amount of coherence within the joint quantum states. To be more specific, we find that the security of the key originates from the coherence of the bipartite quantum state shared by Alice and Bob. Our framework is concise, via which one can derive the final key rate formulas of the BB84 protocol [21, 19] and the six-state protocol [23, 24] . Moreover, the proposed framework allows one to improve the key rates via only modifying the postprocessing in the protocols. Many existing QKD security analyses [20, 19] are based on entanglement distillation protocols [25] , where entanglement is taken as an essential resource to guarantee the security of the final key. In fact, entanglement is a precondition for secure QKD [26] . Thus, we also discuss the interplay among coherence, entanglement, and QKD security.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Table 1 , we list the notations used in the following discussions. In Sec. 2, we review the close relation between quantum coherence and intrinsic randomness. In Sec. 3, we introduce the security analysis framework based on quantifying coherence, and present an explicit key rate formula related to the coherence of the bipartite state in the key generation basis. In Sec. 4, by applying the framework to the BB84 and six-state protocols, we reproduce the original key rate formulas. Then, in Sec. 5, by taking advantage of the framework, we improve the key rates of these two protocols by modifying the postprocessing of the measurement outcomes. Furthermore, in Sec. 6, we apply the framework to solve a practical issue in QKD, detection efficiency mismatch, where two detectors are not identical in terms of the detection efficiency. The derived key rate shows an advantage over previous analyses. We also discuss the interplay among coherence, entanglement, and QKD security in Sec. 7. Finally, we conclude our work and discuss future works in Sec. 8.
Preliminary: coherence and intrinsic randomness
The resource framework of coherence has been formalized lately [3] . A comprehensive review of this topic can be found in Ref. [4] and references therein. Here, we briefly review the concepts involved in this paper. Considering a d-dimensional Hilbert space and a reference (computational) basis I, the amount of coherence in state ρ , measured by relative entropy of coherence [3] , is defined as
Intrinsic randomness is unpredictable compared with the pseudo-randomness produced by deterministic algorithms. Quantum random number generator serves as an elegant solution to the intrinsic randomness generation, via measuring quantum Shannon entropy of a random variable a, − a q(a) log q(a) H(e) binary Shannon entropy function, −e log e − (1 − e) log(1 − e) H(a|b) conditional entropy of two random variables a and b, H(ab) 
state in well-designed methods [27, 28] . Under the resource framework of coherence, it is recently observed that the coherence of a quantum state quantifies the extractable intrinsic randomness by measuring it in the reference basis [17, 16] . Such a relation has been applied to develop source independent quantum random number generators [18] . Let ρ A denote the state of system A that is designed to generate random numbers. Consider a purification of ρ A as |ψ AE , i.e., Tr E [|ψ AE ψ| AE ] = ρ A with Tr E as the partial trace over system E. In a randomness analysis, the purification system E is normally assumed to be held by Eve, who aims at predicting the measurement outcome of ρ A by manipulating system E. Suppose a projective measurement on the I basis is performed on ρ A , then the joint state ρ AE = |ψ AE ψ| AE becomes ρ
Considering the independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) scenario, the intrinsic randomness that is unpredictable to Eve, denoted by R(ρ A ), is measured by the quantum conditional entropy S(A|E) ρ ′
AE
. It is shown to be exactly characterized by the relative entropy of coherence C(ρ S ) [16, 17] ,
Therefore, the resource theory of coherence provides a useful tool to measure the intrinsic randomness in the reference basis.
Security framework with coherence
In this section, we provide a framework that relates the security analysis of QKD to the resource theory of coherence. In QKD, Alice and Bob intend to share a sequence of private and identical bits, called secret key, via communication over an untrusted quantum channel and an authenticated classical channel. Eve can attack the communication channels with any strategies allowed by the principles of quantum mechanics.
In the following discussions, we consider an entanglement-based QKD scheme, since the prepare-and-measure schemes can be converted to the entanglement-based ones with the standard technique [19] . Also, we consider the security analysis with respect to the condition that the shared states between Alice and Bob of different rounds are i.i.d. This is the collective attack scenario considered in QKD [29] . Then, a generic QKD protocol can be described in (ii) They randomly sample N − n copies of ρ AB for parameter estimation, where 0 < n < N.
(iii) For the remaining n copies of ρ AB , Alice and Bob each performs the Z-basis measurement to generate the raw key.
(iv) They perform classical error correction on the raw key to share identical keys.
(v) They perform privacy amplification based on the information provided in the parameter estimation to share private keys. In a security proof, the parameter estimation is a crucial step, which determines the amount of secure keys that can be extracted in QKD. Essentially, Alice and Bob perform some measurement Γ i ∈ Γ to estimate the information of ρ AB , with the expectation value being γ i = Tr(ρ AB Γ i ). As a result, ρ AB should fulfill a set of constraints, ρ AB ∈ S, where S denotes the set which contains all the states satisfying constraints from parameter estimation,
Now we provide the main result of this paper, which connects the key rate of QKD with the relative entropy of coherence. Our derivation is based on the close relation between intrinsic randomness and quantum coherence. Theorem 1. In the asymptotic limit where n, N → ∞, the secret key rate of the above QKD protocol is given by
where Φ(·) is the partial dephasing operation defined in Table 1 and C(·) is the relative entropy of coherence on the computational basis Z A ⊗ Z B defined in Eq. (2.1).
Note that the second term in Eq. (3.2), which accounts for the secret key consumed in the error correction step, can be directly estimated by the measurement statistics from parameter estimation. Sometimes parameter estimation is not even needed here as long as an error verification step is applied after error correction [30] . Thus, the minimization is only on the first term that quantifies the security of the key by quantum coherence. In the following proof, we show an equivalent virtual protocol which employs quantum bit error correction commuting with the Z-basis measurement. This follows the same spirit of Lo-Chau's and Shor-Preskill's proofs for the BB84 protocol [20, 19] .
Proof. Let K(ρ AB ) denote the key rate when the shared quantum state is known to be ρ AB . To estimate the secret key rate K, one should consider the worst case of ρ AB ∈ S, i.e.
where S is the set of quantum states ρ AB that consistent with the measurement statistics obtained in the parameter estimation step, as defined in Table 1 . First, we consider an equivalent virtual protocol, where Alice and Bob perform the error correction before the Z-basis measurement, i.e., step (iii) and (iv) in Fig. 1 are exchanged. Then, step (iii) and step (iv) are replaced by (iii') With the Z-basis measurement results obtained in parameter estimation, Alice and Bob perform quantum bit error correction on the n copies of ρ AB , which is equivalent to apply a global Z-basis parity projector {Π + , Π − } on the joint state. Then, Alice (or Bob) applies the σ x = |0 1|+ |1 0| to rotate all the joint states to the subspace Π + .
(iv') Alice and Bob perform the Z-basis measurement on the error corrected state to generate the identical key.
Note that the quantum bit error correction in step (iii') commutes with the Z-basis measurement, since all operations are performed in the Z basis. Thus, this virtual protocol is equivalent to the one shown in Fig. (1) . The quantum bit error correction in the virtual protocol can be realized with pre-shared nH(Z A |Z B ) EPR pairs. In the original protocol, the amount of key cost is given by the conditional entropy H(Z A |Z B ). This step is essentially classical. See Appendix A for more detailed discussions. Define the bit error rate, e b = Tr(Π − ρ AB ) and
where the equality holds for the symmetric case. After the error correction step (iii'), the original ρ ⊗n AB is transformed to n(1 − e b ) copies of ρ
In step (iv'), when Alice and Bob measure these states in the Z basis, they will get identical keys.
To perform the privacy amplification in step (v), one essentially needs to characterize the amount of intrinsic randomness in the error corrected keys that are unpredictable to Eve. Thus the key rate shows
. (3.5) Recall the relation between intrinsic randomness and coherence shown in Eq. (2.2),
where the reference basis of relative entropy of coherence C coincides with the basis Z A ⊗ Z B . Then we have
where the third equality employs the additivity property of coherence and the Hilbert space of ρ Note that in the symmetric case, where the bit value of the raw key is evenly distributed, the error correction part is given by Eq. (3.4) with equality, then the key rate formula can be further written as,
(3.8)
We need to point out that in general, for the asymmetric case, H(e b ) ≥ H(Z A |Z B ) on account of Fano's inequality.
Key rates of BB84 and six-state QKD
As examples, we apply the framework to the security analysis of the BB84 and six-state QKD protocols in the collective-attack scenario. One can see that the secret key rates of these two protocols can be directly derived within the security framework based on coherence. We list the results of these two re-derivations as the following corollaries. Note that these two protocols only differ from each other on the measurement {Γ i } performed in parameter estimation. For simplicity, we consider the symmetric case, where Eq. (3.8) holds.
BB84 protocol
Consider the entanglement-based version of BB84 protocol, where in parameter estimation, Alice and Bob obtain the bit error rate e b = Tr(Π − ρ AB ) and the phase error rate e p = Tr(Π − x ρ AB ). Then following Theorem 1, we have the following corollary. Corollary 1. The key rate of the BB84 QKD protocol K BB84 is given by
where S contains all the states yielding the same bit error rate e b and phase error rate e p obtained from parameter estimation.
The result is consistent with the one from the Shor-Preskill security proof [19] . We prove this corollary by first showing that K(ρ AB ) ≥ K BB84 for all ρ AB ∈ S, and then giving a specific state in this set to saturate the inequality.
Proof. First note that the four eigenstates of Z A ⊗Z B and X A ⊗X B are a pair of mutually unbiased bases in the 4-dimensional system
Denote the ∆ Z AB (∆ X AB ) to be the projective measurement outcome on the Z A ⊗ Z B (X A ⊗ X B ) basis, respectively. Due to the entropy uncertainty relation [32, 33] , for any state ρ, we have
Hence the relative entropy of coherence in the Z basis satisfies [18] ,
Denoting the rank-2 projective measurement {Π
x } outcomes by ∆ XX , one has the key rate in Eq. (3.8),
where Eq. (4.3) is applied for state Φ(ρ AB ) in the second line. The third line holds due to the following reason. For the state Φ(ρ AB ) which is the partially dephased state on Π + and Π − subspaces, it satisfies,
That is, it has equal probabilities inside each of the rank-2 projectors of X basis, thus
Finally, one can see that the Bell diagonal state with probabilities on
, e b e p } reaches the minimal key rate K BB84 in the state set S.
Six-state protocol
Consider the entanglement-based six-state protocol, where in parameter estimation, Alice and Bob perform the measurement in the X, Y and Z basis respectively. Then, they estimate the error in these three basis e x = e p , e y = Tr(Π − y ρ AB ), and e z = e b . Hence here we have three parameters e x , e y and e z to constrain the state ρ AB .
Suppose that the diagonal terms of ρ AB , when represented in the Bell diagonal basis
} with p i ≥ 0 and i p i = 1. Note that these p i are directly related to the error rates estimated, i.e.
6)
Then following Theorem 1, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 2. The key rate of the six-state QKD protocol K six is given by,
where S contains all the states yielding the same error rates e x , e y and e z obtained from parameter estimation.
The result is consistent with the one from the previous security proof [24] . Note that the state set S is more restrained compared to the one in the BB84 protocol. We prove this corollary by first showing that K(ρ AB ) ≥ K six for all ρ AB ∈ S, and then giving a specific state in this set to saturate the inequality.
Proof. Considering i p i = 1, with Eqs. (4.6) to (4.8) {p i } can be estimated by
10)
Applying Eq. (3.8), the key rate is given by
where in the last line we substitute the relation of e z in Eq. (4.8). The third line can be derived as follows. For the Z and X bases, two mutually unbiased bases of a qubit, the uncertainty relation for coherence measures is given by [18] 
Since ρ + AB is rank-2, it can be viewed as a "qubit" state and the corresponding Z and X bases are Z ′ = {|00 , |11 } and X ′ = {|Φ + , |Φ − } respectively, where
Thus, applying Eq.(4.12) to ρ + AB one has
Similarly,
where Z ′′ and X ′′ basis are {|01 , |10 } and {|Ψ + , |Ψ − } respectively, where
Based on Eq. (4.13) and Eq. (4.14), we obtain the inequality in the third line of Eq. (4.11).
Finally, it is not hard to check that the Bell diagonal state with probabilities {p 0 , p 1 , p 2 , p 3 } reaches the minimal key rate K six in the state set S.
Improve the key rate with the framework
In this section, we show that the above security proof framework using coherence measure allows us to improve the key rates. Essentially, if one can acquire more information about ρ AB in the parameter estimation step, the state set S in Eq. (3.2) will be constrained more tightly, then the key rate can be improved.
We would like to point out an important fact about Theorem 1. In order to estimate the secret key rate generated by an unknown ρ AB , it suffices to gain the information of Φ(ρ AB ), rather than the full information of ρ AB . To be more specific, Alice and Bob only need to estimate and m 03 = m * 30 . The form in Eq. (5.1) provides clear clues to improve the key rates. In the following two subsections, we show the refined key rates for BB84 and six-state protocols with the tools from the resource theory of coherence.
BB84 protocol
In the BB84 protocol, the relations between the error rates e b , e p and the matrix elements of ρ AB , as shown in Eq.(5.1), are
2)
In parameter estimation, Alice and Bob carry out Z A and Z B measurement, respectively. Thus from the measurement results they can obtain not only the bit error rate e b , but also the four diagonal elements in the Z A ⊗ Z B basis, i.e., m 00 , m 11 , m 22 , m 33 . Hence the bit error rate e b can be seen as a coarse-grained parameter from the four diagonal elements.
Based on this observation, we give the refined key rate formula for the BB84 protocol. First, let us define the following optimization problem. Theorem 2. The secret key rate of the BB84 QKD protocol can be estimated via
where {ā,b} is the solution to Problem 1.
Proof. From Eq. (3.8), we need to prove that
, where S contains all the states sharing the same diagonal elements m 00 , m 11 , m 22 , m 33 and the phase error rate e p obtained from parameter estimation.
Define σ AB as the state by removing the imaginary parts of the off-diagonal terms in Φ(ρ AB ),
It is not hard to see that C(Φ(ρ AB )) ≥ C(σ AB ), due to the fact that the magnitude of the off-diagonal elements is reduced. Specifically, considering a qubit density matrix,
after applying the incoherent operationÔ r (ρ) =
where the imaginary part of the off-diagonal terms are removed. As coherence does not increase under incoherent operation, C(ρ) ≥ C(Ô r (ρ)) [3] . Since Φ(ρ AB ) locates in the two rank-2 subspaces Π + and Π − , similarly, one can get C(Φ(ρ AB )) ≥ C(σ AB ) via applying incoherent operations on these two subspaces respectively. As a result, for any state ρ AB ∈ S,
where S σ consists of all the corresponding σ AB from Φ(ρ AB ), and the last line is on account of the definition of Problem 1. Note that σ AB is also a quantum state belonging to the state set S, i.e., σ AB ∈ S, thus the inequality above can be saturated and we get Eq. (5.6).
Now we have the following corollary.
Corollary 3. For the BB84 QKD protocol, K opt BB84 in Eq.(5.5) generally yields a higher secret key rate than the Shor-Preskill one K BB84 in Eq. (4.1),
Corollary 3 can be directly obtained from Eq. (4.1) and Eq. (5.6). Specifically, since more parameters are utilized to constrain the state ρ AB , the state set S in Eq. (5.6) is the subset of the one in Eq. (4.1). As a result, one has K opt BB84 ≥ K BB84 . The proof of Corollary 1 is based on entropy uncertainty relation. Here, we prove Corollary 3 with the tools from the coherence theory [4] . In this way, it is clear to see when the inequality in Eq. (5.11) is saturated.
Proof. DefineÔ ij as the operation 13) where the diagonal elements of the density matrix become equal in two subspaces Π + and Π − respectively after the operation. Clearly,Ô ij is an incoherent operation, thus the coherence of σ ′ AB is not larger than that of σ AB , i.e.,
(5.14)
By definition, one has
≥ min
where S . In practice, in order to achieve this improvement of the key rate, Alice and Bob need to replace the estimation of e b with more refined parameters m 00 , m 11 , m 22 , m 33 in the parameter estimation step, then perform privacy amplification with the updated key rate formula Eq.(5.5). Note that this modification does not require extra efforts, such as quantum or classical communication between Alice and Bob.
Six-state protocol
Similar to the BB84 protocol, one can improve the key rate by utilizing more refined parameters, the four diagonal elements m 00 , m 11 , m 22 , m 33 instead of the coarse-grained one, the error rate e z . Here, we provide the following theorem.
Theorem 3. The secret key rate of six-state QKD protocol can be estimated via Proof. The proof is similar to that of Thereom 2. We need to prove that
, where S contains all the states sharing the same diagonal elements m 00 , m 11 , m 22 , m 33 and the error rates e x and e y obtained from parameter estimation. Recall Eq.(5.10),
where σ AB is defined in Eq.(5.7). Here, S σ = {τ } only has one element, since terms in σ AB can all be determined by parameter estimation in the six-state protocol. Namely, one has Due to monotonicity of coherence under incoherent operation, one has
Here, we substitute the probabilities p i on Bell diagonal basis for the error rates e x , e y and e z with Eqs. (4.6) to (4.8), and calculate the coherence C(τ ′ ).
From Eq. (5.24), it is clear to see that K opt six = K six when the diagonal elements in the two subspaces Π + and Π − are balanced, i.e. m 00 = m 33 and m 11 = m 22 . In practice, to achieve this improvement of the key rate, Alice and Bob need to replace the estimation of e z with the more refined parameters m 00 , m 11 , m 22 , m 33 in the parameter estimation step, then perform the privacy amplification with updated key rate formula Eq. (5.16). Note that this modification does not require extra efforts, such as quantum or classical communication between Alice and Bob.
Numerical simulation
To illustrate the improvement on the security analysis via the coherence framework, we numerically compare the four key rates analyzed above in Fig. 2, i. e., K BB84 in Eq. The numerical result shows that the coherence-based key rate of six-state protocol enjoys the highest key rate, while the Shor-Preskill key rate of BB84 possesses the lowest key rate. As α = 0.5, that is, there is no unbalance of diagonal elements, K opt BB84 = K BB84 and K opt six = K six ; as α departures from 0.5, the unbalance becomes significant and it is clear to see the improvements on the key rates.
We remark that the unbalance of the diagonal elements could happen in practical QKD scenarios. In the next section, one can clearly see that the asymmetry of the detectors can lead to this phenomenon (see ρ Z AB in Eq. (6.10) for an example).
Practical issue: detection efficiency mismatch
In this section, we apply our coherence framework to QKD security analysis when considering a practical issue -detection efficiency mismatch. Here, we focus on analysing the BB84 protocol. We show that the key rate derived by our framework is generally higher than the previous analyses [34] . This manifests the significance of our coherence framework for analysing QKD security.
Ideally, the two detectors which detect |0 and |1 in Z basis (|+ and |− in X basis) respectively are assumed to be identical. However, in practical scenarios, there are always imperfections in the channels and detectors, which may lead to different efficiencies for |0 and |1 (or |+ and |− ) [35] .
Detector model
In practice, the detection efficiency of a detector is normally related to other degrees of freedoms of the inputting photons, such as time, space, or spectrum [34] . For example, Fig. 3 shows the detection efficiency mismatch that is related to the temporal degree of freedom of the injecting photons. Employing the analytical methods in Ref. [34] , here we model the measurement by the two detectors on Bob' side by POVM elements
where 0 ≤ η 0 , η 1 ≤ 1 are the efficiencies of the two detectors. We assume η 0 and η 1 can be calibrated thus are known to Alice and Bob. Here, we decompose M 0 and M 1 by a filtering operation F z and an ideal Z-basis measurement, where
Similarly, the measurement in the X basis with the two nonidentical detectors can be decomposed by a filtering operation,
followed by an ideal X-basis measurement {|+ B +|, |− B −|}. Under this decomposition, before the ideal Z-basis measurement, the state is transformed to 5) and the obtained bit error rate is represented by
Similarly, for the X-basis measurement, one has Due to optical path difference between the two detectors, the two detectors have different detection efficiency in the time domain. If the arrival time of the signal is t 0 , the efficiencies of two detectors are the same. However, if the arrival time is t − (t + ), the efficiency of Detector 0 is higher (lower).
Derivation of the key rate
Essentially, the task of deriving the final key rate is to estimate e ′ p with the knowledge of the measurement results in the Z and X bases.
Let us explicitly write down ρ Z AB in Eq. (6.5), 
Similar as Γ in Eq. (6.15) for the Z basis, Γ ′ can be represented as
By definition in Eq. (6.13), we have
. With Eqs. (6.12), (6.15), (6.19) and (6.20) , the phase error e ′ p can be precisely estimated from the measurement results in Z and X bases. By contrast, e ′ p is roughly upper bounded in previous results [34] . This precise estimation of e ′ p allows Alice and Bob to obtain a higher key rate than the previous analysis. Also, the key rate can be further improved by applying Theorem 2 to ρ Z AB . Therefore, with the coherence framework, one can expect a higher key rate than the previous ones. This is to be illustrated in the following subsection.
Analytical key rate formula under symmetric attack
To simplify the analysis, we assume Eve's attack to be symmetric between bits 0 and 1 in the Z/X-basis, i.e., the diagonal elements of ρ AB in both the Z basis and the X basis are balanced. That is m 00 = m 33 = c, (6.21)
with the normalization condition 2(c + d) = 1. Meanwhile, for the X basis, one has
with 2(c ′ + d ′ ) = 1. Then via Eq. (6.11), one has
where Γ is a constant related to the detection efficiency. With Eqs. (6.8), (6.16) and (6.17), one has
where the last line is on account of the definition of e ′′ p . Inserting Eqs. (6.23) and (6.24) into Eq. (6.12), we have 25) which means e ′ p can be precisely estimated with e p . With Eq. (6.25), one can estimate the key rate by applying Theorem 2. For the current scenario that is restricted to the symmetric attack, the optimization Problem 1 can be solved analytically. See Appendix C for detailed derivation. The key rate is given by
where
Comparatively, Ref. [34] proposes two methods of analyzing the key rate with the detection efficiency mismatch issue. There, one key rate formula is obtained via the data discarding process,
The other key rate is obtained via a virtual protocol based on Koashi's complimentary approach [36] ,
To compare above key rates, K, K 1 and K 2 , we first consider the noiseless case, where e p = e b = 0. Then, one has K = H(
In the noisy case, the key rates obtained from the three analysis are plotted in Fig. 4 . It shows that K is larger than K 2 for any efficiency mismatch extent; while K is larger than K 1 if the mismatch is not too serious. This manifests the advantage of coherence framework for analysing QKD security.
When the efficiency mismatch becomes large (x approaches 0 in Fig. 4 ), K becomes negative; but K 1 keeps positive and thus larger than K. This fact can be understood as follows. Suppose the initial state before measurement ρ AB possesses positive key rate (bit and phase error are both small). The data discarding approach effectively transforms the state ρ Z AB to ρ AB with probability
, thus the key rate K 1 is always positive. As x → 0 (η 0 → 0), the probability of successful transform approaches 0, thus K 1 → 0. On the other hand, as x → 0, the phase error of the state ρ Z AB in Eq. (6.25) approaches 1/2. Consequently, the first two terms in Eq.(6.26) approaches zero, and K → −H(e b ) ≤ 0 .
Relation with entanglement
The existing security analyses [20, 19] usually starts from entanglement distillation protocols [25, 37] , where entanglement is taken as an essential resource to deliver the security of the final key. On the contrary, our work is based on the relation between quantum coherence and intrinsic randomness, which is related to the security in QRNG and QKD. Specifically, after correcting the bit errors, we take Alice and Bob as a whole and analyse the intrinsic randomness out of reach of Eve. From this point of view, our approach shares similarity with Koashi's, which is based on the complementary arguments for the joint system [36] . In addition, recently there are several works considering the interplay between coherence and entanglement [38, 39] . However, we remark that in these works the authors normally investigate converting subsystem coherence (not the coherence in the bipartite system) into global correlations and the incoherent operations used there cannot be directly applied into the QKD security analysis.
Here, we show some relations between our key rate and the entanglement property of the input state ρ AB . As shown in Eq. (3.8), the key rate can be enhanced if Alice and Bob acquire more information of the shared state ρ AB and estimate the coherence of Φ(ρ AB ) more accurately. Suppose Alice and Bob perform a full tomography of ρ AB in the parameter estimation step, then the state set S only contains one state ρ AB . An upper bound for the key rate is shown in the following observation. Proposition 1. Consider a protocol in which a full tomography on ρ AB is performed in the parameter estimation, then the key rate is upper bounded by
Note that the right side of Eq. (7.1) is the hashing inequality for the state Φ(ρ AB ), which is a lower bound for one-way LOCC entanglement distillation protocol [29, 37] . We remark that the projection operation Φ on state ρ AB is a non-local operation, hence our analysis framework based on coherence could potentially yield higher key rate than the usual entanglement distillation analysis. For conciseness, we leave the proof of Observation 1 in Appendix D. And we also compare our key rate with the DevetakWinter formula [29] in Appendix E. Now we define a key rate that is independent of measurement basis by maximizing the key rate generated by state ρ AB over all local basis, i.e., 
where the minimization is over all the convex decompositions of ρ AB = p i Ψ i .
Proof. Note that the key rate K is convex due to the convexity of the relative entropy of coherence and the concavity of the von Neumann entropy. Hence, for any decomposition
represents the optimal local basis for ρ AB and the last inequality holds since one can improve the key rate of Ψ i further by choosing specific optimal basis for each of them. Consequently, the maximal key rate is upper bounded by the entanglement of formation as shown in Eq. (7.3).
Here, it is also clear to see that the key rate for any separable state K m (ρ sep AB ) ≤ 0, since they can be written as the combination of product states [26] .
Discussion and conclusion
We have proposed a framework that captures the close relation between coherence and QKD. By considering a generic entanglement-based QKD protocol, the framework shows that the secure key rates can be quantified via the coherence of the shared bipartite quantum states. By applying the proposed framework to the BB84 and six-state protocols, we reproduce the key rates. Furthermore, the framework can even allow us to improve the key rates by modifying the postprocessing. And it is also shown to be advantageous to analyze the practical issue, detector efficiency mismatch in QKD. More generally, the coherence-based framework also provide us convenience to analyse the key rate by using tools from coherence theory.
Along this direction, a number of problems can be explored in the future. Apart from the currently studied cases, the framework has potential to be applied to many other QKD protocols, such as three state protocol [40, 41] and B92 protocol [42] . There, similar derivation and improvement on the key rate are expected. In particular, the framework can be naturally extended to measurement-device-independent QKD [43] , since bipartite quantum states are directly distributed and measured in this kind of protocol. In addition, generalization to high dimensional QKD and continuous-variable QKD [44] is also interesting. Also, we expect our framework to be useful in addressing more practical issues in QKD, the solutions to many of which are missing or very complicated at the moment.
Moreover, we should remark that it is intriguing to reexamine the previous QKD security analyses from the coherence theory point of view. To be specific, a common technique of security analysis is to transform the original protocol to equivalent virtual protocols, which are easier to analyse but share same amount of secure keys. In the virtual protocol, the operations conducted there are incoherent operations [4] (more specifically, dephasing-covariant incoherent operation [45, 46] ), which commute with the final Z-basis measurement to generate key. In addition, it is also interesting to investigate the connection between coherence and entanglement [38, 39, 47, 48, 49] under the scenario of security analysis, which not only deepens our understanding of these basic quantum resources, but also inspires useful applications in quantum information processing.
We first clarify the classical error correction of the original protocol in Fig. 1 , and then convert it to a quantum version, the quantum bit error correction of the virtual protocol.
In the original protocol, after the Z-basis measurement on ρ ⊗n AB , Alice and Bob get an n-bit string Z are not identical in general. Then, in (linear) error correction, Alice generate an error syndrome by hashing her bit string with an nH(Z A |Z B ) × n random binary matrix. By consuming nH(Z A |Z B ) pre-shared secret bits, Alice sends the syndrome to Bob safely with the one-time-pad encryption. After obtaining the syndromes, Bob can correct the corresponding error bits.
In the virtual protocol, the quantum bit error correction is executed before the Z-basis measurement. Specifically, Alice and Bob now share nH(Z A |Z B ) ancillary EPR pairs. First, they use their state ρ ⊗n AB to control the EPR pairs according to the hashing matrix separately, where the ancillary EPR pairs act as the target of the CNOT gate. Second, they measure the EPR pairs in the Z basis separately and get the measurement results Z where the inequality in the fourth line is due to the concavity of entropy.
Appendix E. Comparison with the Devetak-Winter formula
The Devetak-Winter formula shows that the key rate of state ρ AB in the i.i.d. scenario is K D−W = S(Z A |E) − H(Z A |Z B ). The second term H(Z A |Z B ) relates to classical bit error correction, which is essentially the same in most of security proofs including ours. Thus, we focus on the first term S(Z A |E) which is used to estimate the privacy of the key. In fact, it can be written in the relative entropy form [47, 50] as
where ∆ A is the partial dephasing channel operating on system A and ∆ A (ρ AB ) = i=0,1 |i A i|ρ AB |i A i|. Here S(Z A |E) equals to the amount of basis-dependent discord of ρ AB [51] , as ∆ A (ρ AB ) is a c-q state given Z A basis. On the other hand, the term relative to privacy, C(Φ(ρ AB )) in our key formula in Eq. (3.2), can also be written in the relative entropy form. By definition [3] , we have
where ∆ is the full dephasing channel for Z A ⊗ Z B basis. And C(Φ(ρ AB )) quantifies the global coherence of Φ(ρ AB ).
